MARKET EXPERIENCE, CONSUMER ATTENTION AND PRICE-QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS FOR NEW WORLD WINES IN THE US MARKET, 1987-1999
Quality signals are important determinants of the prices received by competing offerings, especially in markets for experience goods. However, given consumers' cognitive limitations, all signals can not receive equal attention. We argue that the level of attention paid to a product's quality signals increases with its producer's level of market experience, and (given attention spillovers across associated products), with the experience of associated producers. Price-quality relationships are therefore stronger as these levels of experience (which correspond with the cumulative number of prior product evaluations) accumulate. Our predictions are confirmed in an analysis of New World wine producers selling into the US market over the 1987-99 period.
"a signal hitherto unheard is useless by itself … (Arrow, 1974: 40)" Higher-quality products, or those with more attractive features, should command higher prices and, ceteris paribus, earn higher returns. However, when product quality cannot be determined in advance of purchase -i.e., when products are what Nelson (1970) calls 'experience goods' -potential consumers must rely on a host of signals in forming quality expectations. One set of signals that operates in a number of markets is the quality ratings made by product experts (Rao, 1994; Baum and Powell, 1995) . Business Week provides regular assessments of the quality of graduate business programs, while publications like Consumer Reports provide similar ratings across a wide range of product categories. In the wine industry (the focus of this study), quality ratings are provided by the Wine Spectator, the Connoisseur's Guide, and the Wine Advocate.
When quality matters to potential consumers, and the opinions of experts are deemed reliable, the price received for a given product will be positively related to its quality rating. In a broad study of numerous product categories reviewed by Consumer Reports, Caves and Greene (1996) find that the median rank correlation between quality and price is between 0.27 and 0.38. In their study of price-quality relationships in a sample of Bordeaux wines, Landon and Smith (1997) find a positive relationship between the quality score reported in the Wine Spectator and wine price. A similar result is obtained by Benjamin and Podolny (1999) in their study of California wines (using quality ratings from the Connoisseur's Guide to California Wines). These studies all suggest that expert quality ratings provide important information about product quality to potential consumers.
There is reason to believe, however, that these ratings are neither definitive, nor fully diffused across potential consumers. In the former respect, an attribute such as product quality is both multi-faceted and intangible. As such, it may be problematic to distill the relevant information into a single rating that captures all pertinent dimensions succinctly and accurately. In the latter respect, there is unlikely to be a direct line of communication between the experts who rate products and all potential consumers of those products. For these reasons, recent research into price-quality relationships looks beyond the quality rating of the focal product to consider the producer's recent history of quality demonstrations. In the spirit of Shapiro's (1983) model of reputation formation, previous demonstrations of quality should translate into a reputation for product quality that is reflected in current prices. Again in the wine industry, Landon and Smith (1997) and Benjamin and Podolny (1999) find that a producer's previous wine quality ratings have the predicted positive impact on the prices of its current product offerings.
We take it as given that a product's quality rating and its producer's reputation for quality are important signals that affect the price that it receives in the marketplace. The aim of this paper is to question the extent to which these signals are uniformly attended to, and acted upon by consumers. In particular, we are interested in the changing sensitivity of price to quality signals as markets evolve over time. The impact that a quality signal has on price must depend on the extent to which it is noticed and internalized by potential consumers (Olshavsky, 1994) . Rather than assume that all signals have equal impact, we follow Kahneman (1973: 10) and recognize that "we may fail to detect or recognize a signal because we were not paying attention to it." This issue is critical given the almost infinite number of signals that are generated at any point in time, combined with the limited amount of attention that can be paid by boundedly rational individuals to those signals (Simon, 1997) . In what follows, we argue that consumer attention to a producer's quality signals is a positive function of that producer's level of experience in the market. In addition, due to spillovers across associated producers, attention should also increase with the level of associated producer experience. This leads us to hypothesize that the impact of quality signals on price will be higher for experienced, as opposed to inexperienced producers, or groups of associated producers.
While this issue has not yet been researched directly, there is some evidence that these relationships do vary over the life cycle of an industry. Gorton's (1996) analysis of reputation formation in early US bank note markets suggests that as this market matured, borrowers had access to, and presumable made use of finer-grained information about differences across borrowing banks: "in the early period [1839] [1840] [1841] [1842] [1843] [1844] [1845] , market participants know the characteristics of the state banking system, and possibly little else about entering banks. But in the last period … the state characteristics are not priced. This would occur if market participants had finer information than state risk characteristics (1996: 386) ." Mannering and Whinston (1991: 75, footnote) make a similar remark in their analysis of the ascendance of Japanese auto producers within US markets: "[the 1973 energy shock] focused customers' attention on the fuel efficiency of Japanese vehicles. But consumers eventually learned that Japanese vehicles possessed other attractive attributes besides fuel efficiency." Here, an exogenous event led to increased experience with Japanese cars. Only after sales began to accumulate did consumers become aware of the competitive superiority of the different features built into the Japanese cars.
Both of these examples suggest that accumulated market experience moderates the relationship between quality signals and price. With little or no prior experience, consumers do not attend to subtle differences across competing offerings. As time passes, and experience accumulates, they begin to pay closer attention to particular features of the different offerings and make more detailed discriminations.
Our specific arguments linking market experience to attention are laid out in the next section.
The ensuing section describes the data used in our study. The global wine industry is an appropriate focus for this research because of the relatively recent and dramatic rise of New World wine producers on international markets. In the mid-1980's these wine makers -including those from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Israel, New Zealand and South Africa -were insignificant players (Arkell, 1999) . From 1984 to 1986, average annual exports from these seven countries amounted to 57,000 metric tonnes, which was less than two percent of that exported by the four largest Old Word wine countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain). By the late 1990s, the situation had changed dramatically. Over the 1996 to 1998 period, average annual exports from these New World wine countries increased to roughly 816,000 metric tonnes, more than 20 percent of Old World country export levels.
1 This dramatic ascendance offers an opportunity to examine the relationship between a product's quality signals and its price in a context wherein a key class of producers were emerging on the world scene. Nelson (1970) introduced the distinction between search and experience goods. For search goods, consumers can (if they choose to expend the effort) obtain information about important product characteristics in advance of purchase. For experience goods, however, search is ineffective and consumers must rely on signals -such as quality evaluations by experts, and producers' reputations for quality -in making assessments of a given offering. Until now, there has been an implicit assumption that the quality signals generated across producers, as well as over time have uniform influence (Pratt, et al., 1979: 190) . We begin with the proposition that consumers do not attend equally to all quality signals. This is consistent with Simon (1997: 94) , who stresses that "rationality requires a choice among all possible alternative behaviors. In actual 1 All reported wine export data are from the FAO Statistical Database, UN Food and Agricultural Organization, Rome, 2000. behavior, only a few of all these possible alternatives ever come to mind." It is also supported by Arrow (1974: 37) , who notes that "each individual economic agent is assumed to start with the ability to receive some signals from the natural and social environment. This capacity is not, however, unlimited, and the scarcity of information-handling ability is an essential feature for understanding ... behavior." Finally, the point is made emphatically by Cyert and March (1963: 235) when they state that "the idea is simple. Individuals attend to some things, and thus do not attend to others."
MARKET EXPERIENCE AND PRICE-QUALITY RELATIONSHIPS
The central problem becomes that of isolating the factors that increase the amount of attention paid to a given set of signals. The issue of scarce attention has been addressed in an intraorganizational context. Ocasio (1997) outlines an attention-based theory of the firm that builds on Simon's original work. Here, individual attention within organizations is channeled by specific routines or standard operating procedures. In Cyert and March's (1963) behavioral model, attention shifts as a function of the competing claims made by the organization's different factions or coalitions. Our concern, however, is with the market context. Here, a number of candidate factors warrant consideration. Random events may direct attention toward a given producer, or group of associated producers. This was the case when the oil price shocks in the 1970s led US consumers to pay more attention to fuel-efficient Japanese cars (Mannering and Winston, 1991) . Or, endorsements by, or affiliations with other salient actors may attract the attention of potential consumers (Podolny, 1993) . An organizations' promotion or advertising initiatives may also attract consumer attention to its product and service offerings (Hoch and Ha, 1986; Vakratsas and Ambler, 1999) .
Although these accidents, affiliations and strategic actions may increase consumer attention, we focus on the process whereby attention accumulates as a function of market experience. This factor is particularly important in an evolutionary context, as it suggests fundamental differences in the amount of attention paid to signals generated by new entrants versus experienced producers, as well as differences depending on the stage of industry development. Our main point is that producers differ in terms of their levels of market experience, and that these differences impact on the extent to which consumers have had prior exposure to their offerings.
These exposures affect attention levels because as they accumulate, they orient consumers toward a given set of products. Various aspects of market experience may lead to this predicted effect, including a producer's time in the market, its cumulative prior output, and its cumulative prior quality demonstrations (in terms of the aforementioned critical reviews). The longer a producer has been in the market, the more time consumers have to become familiar with it and its product offerings. Greater prior output or sales increases the likelihood that consumers have observed or consumed a producer's products. It correspondingly increases the probability that an individual has heard of that producer from a friend, or some other market contact. These direct and indirect experiences also orient consumers to a producer, thereby placing its products within the extensive consideration set (Murthi and Srinivasan, 1999) . Finally, and especially in markets for experience goods, prior expert evaluations are important stimuli that also orient consumers to a producer's products. Because of their expected salience, these stimuli are likely to reach consumers and, as they accumulate, attract more attention. All of this suggests that a producer's market experience will enhance the extent to which its product's quality signals are heeded by consumers.
There is support in the literature for a proposed relationship between consumer attention and market experience. According to Simon (1997) , cognitive constraints lead to the development of habits, or routines, which ensure that "attention and behavior, once initiated in a certain direction, tend to persist in that direction for a considerable interval of time." Because inexperienced producers enter from outside the prevailing set of habits or routines, they must work hard to overcome this inertia, in our case through the accumulation of a base of market experience. The idea also finds support in Rogers' (1995) model of innovation diffusion.
Diffusion follows an S-curve trajectory because of the dependence of current innovation adoptions on cumulative prior adoptions. In his model, prior adoptions increase the probability that the focal actor will be aware of the particulars of the innovative product or practice.
Related to this notion of experience-based attention is that of density-driven, and age-dependent cognitive legitimacy. That the development of cognitive legitimacy is an important factor in the development of an industry is underscored by Aldrich and Fiol (1994) . According to standard ecological arguments, the survival prospects of organizations initially increases with the density of those organizations within the population. The logic underlying this relationship is legitimacybased. As an organizational type proliferates, key stakeholders come to see it as increasingly appropriate and become less timid in their interactions with it. At the level of the specific organization, arguments have also been made about a liability of newness (Freeman, et al., 1983) . Here, inexperienced organizations suffer from low legitimacy in part because they have not had the opportunity to develop a reliable and consistent set of relations with external stakeholders. Each of these points is consistent with our assertion that cumulative experience with a producer and its products attracts the attention of consumers, and make its products worthy of closer scrutiny.
In summary, the amount of attention paid to a producer's quality signals increases with its market experience. As such, prices for experienced producers should be more sensitive to the quality signals that are generated:
Hypothesis 1: The sensitivity of a product's price to its own quality signals is positively related to the market experience of its producer.
Note that our argument is that market experience leads to increased attention, which leads to prices being more sensitive to quality signals. This is different from a hypothesized main effect of market experience on price. Typical experience-based arguments suggest that production costs fall as a function of accumulated experience (Argote, 1999) . Moving this logic to the output side, one also expects that prices will increase as a producer accumulates certain customer-based assets (i.e., brands, installed customer bases, or distribution channels), the development of which may be experience-dependent. While this may be the case (and our models allow us to test for this possibility), our hypothesis predicts a moderating effect of experience on the relationship between quality signals and price. In other words, experienced producers can expect a heightened sensitivity of price to quality signals, something that would help the high-quality producers, but hurt those that produce low-quality offerings.
The Effects of Associated Experience
Bounded rationality makes consumer attention a relatively scarce commodity. We suggest that a producer's own market experience attracts the attention of potential consumers, which makes the prices of its products more sensitive to the quality signals that it generates. We now consider the competitive context in which producers operate, where actions that impact on the attention received by one producer should affect the amount of attention paid to others. If attention is producer-specific, and if it is in comparatively short supply, then this impact should be competitive. Any attention paid to one producer would come at the expense of that paid to others. However, attention has the properties of a public good. As we have conceptualized it, attention serves to orient consumers to a given product so that a finer-grained assessment may be made. This assessment entails quality-based comparisons with other products, and this need for comparison creates attention spillovers across associated producers. Note that associated here does not refer to formal or informal arrangements, but rather to the cognitive links that place products, and therefore producers into similar consideration sets. These attention spillovers are within the set of information spillovers discussed by Baum and Haveman (1997) in their analysis of the Manhattan hotel industry. Entering hotels seek to be similar to established firms on some key dimensions in order to benefit from access to a common pool of resources (which includes customer access and cognitive legitimacy). They also have an incentive to differentiate themselves from those others on order to wield some degree of market power. In the current context, similarity along some product dimension creates a potential association in the minds of consumers, which allows for attention spillovers. Once noticed and taken seriously, producers have an incentive to compete on some other product dimension (i.e., relative product quality).
Once again, the idea that the market experience of one organization can spill over to related organizations finds support in the literature. Research into experience curves finds that firms learn not only from their own experience, but (under appropriate conditions) also from the experience of others. Ingram and Baum (1997) , for example, find that the failures rates of US hotel chains fall as a function of cumulative industry experience -both before and after the chain's founding. And, while there is some debate about the extent to which cognitive legitimacy is shared equally by all organizations within a population (Rao, 1994; Baum and Powell, 1995) , it is accepted that the taken-for-granted status of a given organization is influenced by the presence of other organizations of the same type. Hannan et al. (1995) , for example, show that the legitimacy of automobile producers in one European country is enhanced by the density of producers in other countries.
This leaves the issue of how product associations are formed in the minds of consumers. This is an empirical issue. An association is in place whenever similarity on some dimension causes consumers to place products into the same consideration set. In many cases, the specific dimensions that lead to such associations are structural, and immune to strategic manipulation in the short run. Cars are thought of as small, medium-sized or luxurious, and hotels are distinguished based on location and luxury levels. There may also be scenarios wherein entrepreneurs seek to create or emphasize a novel product dimension that creates a new set of product associations (e.g. the emergence of 'on-line' brokerages). In any case, a focus on consumer attention mandates that associations be considered from their perspective. In other words, researchers must show that a given dimension is salient to consumers before considering it as a basis for association.
This paper considers country-of-origin associations. There is little doubt that the country of origin is a salient characteristic in the wine industry. A tour through any wine store will show that products are commonly organized by country of origin. The same is true for the discussions and analyses in most wine industry publications. We are not suggesting that country of origin is the only basis on which associations are formed. Other candidates include geographic distinctions at a more or less aggregate level of analysis (e.g. New World versus Old World producers, or more specific regions or appellations). Alternatively, product types may serve as a basis for association (e.g., a wine's primary grape type). However, given widespread interest in issues relating to regional competitiveness and global competition, it is useful to begin by testing our second hypothesis in this way.
In summary, we argue that products may benefit from attention spillovers which originate with the market experience of associated producers. One important set of associations derives from a product's country of origin. Therefore, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: The sensitivity of a product's price to its quality signals is positively related to the market experience of associated (i.e. same-country) producers.
DATA AND ANALYSIS
The data for this study are from the Wine Spectator and cover wine evaluations conducted during the 1984 to 1999 period. According to The Economist (1999a: 94) , "wine ratings have never wielded such astonishing influence, especially in America. Foremost among the wine raters are two American publications, the Wine Advocate and the Wine Spectator." Although the Wine
Advocate provides price and quality data for New World wines, its coverage of non-US wines is more limited (i.e., fewer than 700 observations versus roughly 6,500 from the Wine Spectator).
Moreover, "the Spectator ... reaches an audience over six times larger than the Advocate's (Economist, 1999a: 94) ."
A total of 7,241 evaluations of (non-US) New World wines have been conducted by the Wine Spectator since 1984 (see Table 1 ). 2 While this number appears high, it pales in comparison to the 45,013 evaluations of wines originating in France, Italy, Germany and Spain. This contrast is even more stark during the 1984 to 1986 period when the New World producers generated only sixteen evaluations, compared to 725 for the Old Word producers. In conjunction with the previous remarks about export levels, this suggests that US consumers lacked awareness of New
World wines in the early years following 1986. It also suggests that New World wineries would have struggled to get their products noticed, especially when "the most striking thing about the wine shelves of the average supermarket is the sheer range and profusion of wines on offer (Economist, 1999b: 94) ." in the Wine Spectator. These ratings come from blind tastings by wine experts, and the process ensures that tasters do not know who made the wine, or its list price when they assign their quality ratings. We are therefore confident that these ratings are not spuriously influenced by producer or country reputation, or by the wines' suggested retail prices. A producer's reputation for quality is the average quality score of all other wines produced by the same winery in the focal year, or in one of the two preceding years (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) . Both the quality and producer reputation variables are mean-centered.
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The discussion surrounding hypothesis 1 suggests that there are several aspects of market experience that warrant attention: time in the market, cumulative prior sales, and cumulative prior quality evaluations. This paper focuses on the latter, which reflects the number of prior quality signals that a producer, or a country has generated. In markets for experience goods, these expert evaluations provide visible stimuli that orient consumers to a particular product or group of products. In particular, the producer experience variable is the count of prior winery evaluations up to year t-1. Country experience is the count of prior same-country evaluations 
Figure 1 about here
Although we employ these count-based measures of experience in the models that we report, we also explored other approaches. We ran each model using experience variables that reflect producer and country duration in the US market. These clock variables are dated from the first year in which a producer, or a country reports an observation in the sample. The two variables are highly correlated with the count-based measures: the correlation between the producer and country experience variables being 0.750 and 0.839, respectively. Moreover, the time-based measures yields virtually identical results in all models. We also considered experience measures based on cumulative US sales. Although data limitations preclude us from using sales-based measures, we would like to dispel the notion that there is a bias in the selection of wines being evaluated over time (Combris, et al., 1997) . According to the Wine Spectator (1998), "wines are chosen for tasting from those sent to our offices and from wines we purchase at retail." If the wines chosen for tasting are in some ways biased toward certain countries or certain producers, then interpretation of the experience effects becomes more complex. However, at the country level, there is a very strong correspondence between the cumulative number of prior evaluations and the cumulative volume of prior global exports. Across the seven countries, the correlations between the cumulative exports and cumulative evaluations time series range from a low of 0.860 (Canada) to a high of 0.997 (Chile). 5 These explorations suggest a high correlation across the three aspects of market experience and give us confidence in using the count-based measures of experience.
The control variables include a set of indicator variables for grape type and for country, and a time trend variable dated from 1987. We also control for the age of the wine, expecting that wines that have been aged longer should command higher prices. Another control is for the total number of wines from the focal winery that are evaluated in the focal year. If product line breadth signals lower prestige, then wineries that offer a broad range of different wines should command lower prices. Moreover, if there are non-trivial fixed costs associated with exporting wine, then wineries that export only one or two wines per year should be biased in selecting higher-priced wines for export. Because the wines in our sample are produced in different countries, the price in the US may be affected by exchange rate fluctuations. In particular, exchange rate depreciations should be associated with lower production costs, and therefore lower prices in the US. We control for this possibility with a variable that accounts for the 5 Because we do not have winery-specific export or sales data, we must assume that there is a similar lack of bias at the winery level. In a separate analysis, we found that the number of wines from a given producer that are evaluated in any year is unrelated to the lagged average quality score for that producer. This suggests that there is no systematic bias in favor of evaluating wines that are expected to be of higher quality.
percentage change (relative to 1987) of the value of each country's currency relative to the US dollar. Finally, as the wines in our sample are produced in different quantities, price-quantity trade-offs may affect our results. The Wine Spectator reports quantity data (i.e., the total number of cases produced) for 63 percent of the observations in our sample. We use this variable (which ranges from a low of 16 cases to a high of 800,000 cases) as a proxy for the quantity available for sale in the US and run a follow-on model on the reduced sample to ensure that our results are robust to the inclusion of quantity data.
There are roughly 6,600 New World wine quality observations from the 1987 to 1999 period.
The sample size was reduced due to missing price, grape type, or vintage data. We also excluded wines whose real price was more than two standard deviations above the sample average (believing that these wines tend to be priced for investment as well as consumption). Descriptive statistics and pair-wise correlations for all variables are in Tables 2 and 3 . The average wine in the sample cost $9.55 (in 1987 dollars) and was 2.33 years old at time of release. The average winery had 5.58 wines evaluated in any year. The number of prior evaluations for the average producer (country) was 13.45 (931.8).
Tables 2 and 3 about here

RESULTS
Results from a longitudinal analysis are found in Table 4 . Model 1 contains only the control variables. Wine price increases with age, and decreases with the number of bottles produced by the winery in the focal year. Each of these results is consistent with expectations. There is also evidence of an upward trend in real prices over time. Finally, the exchange rate effect is positive (as expected), but not significant. Model 2 adds the variables that capture a wine's quality score, and the reputation of its producer. An F-test shows that these two variables significantly improve the fit of the model. Wines of higher quality, and those whose producers have better reputations for quality command significantly higher prices.
Table 4 about here
Model 3 tests whether the sensitivity of a wine's price to its quality signals varies with the producer's experience. An F-test suggests that adding the three variables significantly improves the fit of the model. The main effect of experience is to significantly lower the price charged for a bottle of wine. At the same time, the interaction between wine quality and producer experience is positive and significant, supporting hypothesis 1. The coefficient on the interaction between reputation and producer experience is also positive, but significant only at the 0.05 level. Model 4 tests for similar effects attributable to the market experience of other producers from the same country. Once again, an F-test suggests that the additional variables improve the fit of the model (relative to Model 2). This time, the main effect of country experience is not significant. The coefficients on the interactions between country experience and both wine quality and producer reputation are positive and significant. These results support hypotheses 2. Model 5 combines the producer and country experience effects into the same model. Compared to Model 2, the main effects of quality and reputation are much lower -roughly half. Moreover, the sensitivity of a wine's price to its quality and producer reputation signals increases significantly with country experience. The sensitivity of price to quality, but not producer reputation, increases significantly with producer experience.
67
6 A potential concern with Model 5 is that there may be an interaction between quality and producer reputation (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999) . If this is true, and if one or both of these variables trend upward over time, then the observed interactions between the quality and experience variables may be The final model in Table 4 uses a reduced sample to determine whether the results in Model 5 are sensitive to the inclusion of a variable that captures the total quantity produced. Note first that this reduced sample is not quite representative of the overall sample. The average real price is $9.80 (compared to $9.11 for the omitted observations), while the average quality score is 0.572 (compared to -1.151). This said, all of the main results from Model 5 are replicated in Model 5a, while the quantity variable has the predicted negative coefficient.
Cross-Sectional Analysis of Old and New World Producers
The longitudinal analysis reported in Table 4 invites one alternative interpretation. The time period covered by the analysis corresponds to most of the period that the Wine Spectator has published its quality ratings. Therefore, rather than capturing the increased attention that New World wines were garnering over the sample period, the results may reflect consumers' increased attention to, and confidence in the ratings themselves. To be clear, this is still be an attention-based explanation, but with the increased attention being conferred on the signal generator over time. To rule out this possibility, we conducted a cross-sectional analysis of Old and New World wines in 1987. This year is selected because it offers a sharp contrast between these two groups of producers. Recall from Table 1 that in 1987, Australia and Chile had only sixteen prior evaluations between them, while wineries from France and Italy had accumulated 652 prior wine evaluations. This difference clearly reflects the relative inexperience of the spurious. To rule out this possibility, we re-estimated Model 5 including a Quality*Reputation interaction term. As expected, the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant. However, the remaining results are unchanged. 7 It has been suggested that experience effects need not be linear (Baum and Ingram, 1998) . We explored this possibility by replacing both experience variables with their log transformations and re-estimating Model 5. The model with linear experience effects (adjusted R 2 of 0.414) offers greater explanatory power than that with the log experience effects (adjusted R 2 of 0.406). However, this can not be a full refutation of the non-linear experience arguments given the relatively short time period (i.e., twelve years) covered in this study.
Australian and Chilean producers in the US market at that time.
If our hypotheses about the effects of market experience are valid, we should observe significant experience-quality signal interactions in this cross-section of Old and New World wines. Model 6 indicates that the price of a bottle of wine in 1987 was positively related to its quality score, as well as to the reputation of its producer. Model 7 shows that these relationships are moderated to a significant extent by the producer and country experience variables. Producer experience significantly increases the sensitivity of a wine's price to its quality score, while country experience increases the sensitivity of price to both quality and producer reputation. Therefore, holding the attention paid to, and legitimacy conferred upon the quality rater constant, we are able to replicate the results from Table 4 .
Table 5 about here
The final two models in Table 5 analyze wines from two countries -Australia and France. In the 1987 sample, the average quality score for the 108 Australian wines is 0.103, which is actually greater than that for the 481 French wines (-0.179). The average producer reputation for the Australian wineries (0.019) is also greater than that for the French wineries (-0.137). These differences suggest that in 1987, wine experts were impressed by the quality of Australian wines and wine producers. However, at that time, there were 465 prior assessments of French wines compared to only fourteen for the Australian wines. A comparison of the sensitivity of wine price to quality and reputation signals across the sub-samples of Australian and French wines in 1987 therefore offers a conservative test of our thesis that market experience has important implications for how quality signals are manifested in product price. Looking across Models 8 and 9, the coefficients on both quality score and producer reputation are greater in the French sub-sample. An F-test (F=16.952, p=0.000) confirms that these differences are significant.
Despite the fact that Australian wines were garnering more favorable reviews, the prices they received were significantly less sensitive to the quality signals being generated.
Incorporating Country Reputations
So far, our analysis has considered only product and producer-level quality signals. However, Landon and Stuart (1997) suggest that a collective reputation for quality may also serve as an important market signal. If access to more proximate quality signals is problematic, consumers may rely on more imperfect but diffuse signals, such as collective reputations, in making their decisions (Tirole, 1996) . In the current context, it is reasonable to suggest that low levels of consumer attention imply reduced access to the more proximate quality signals. Therefore, collective reputations should have an effect on price when attention (or the levels of market experience) is low, but should lose their impact as attention increases.
The models in Table 6 consider this possibility. Country reputation for quality (a variant of a collective reputation) is operationalized as the average quality score of all other wines produced within the same country (but by a different wine producer) in the focal year, or in one of the two preceding years. According to Model 10, this variable by itself has no significant effect on wine price. However, this null result masks important interactions with both experience variables.
Models 11 shows that the main effect of country reputation is positive and significant. However the interactions with both producer and country experience are negative and significant. When the level of market experience is low, consumers do tend to rely on the more diffuse quality signal. However, as attention increases, consumers make greater use of the products' quality scores and of their producers' reputations and rely less on the country reputation signal. In fact, in the upper range of the experience variables, better quality demonstrations by other samecountry wineries actually lowers the price earned by the focal bottle. As consumers pay closer attention to differences among New World wines and producers, the relationship among quality demonstrations by same-country wineries becomes competitive, rather than complementary. This is consistent with the results reported by Baum and Haveman (1997) . Same-country producers benefit from each others' quality demonstrations because they create attention spillovers.
However, the increased attention facilitates quality-based competition among these same producers. The overall relationship among associated producers is a combination of complementary and competitive.
Table 6 about here
These effects are demonstrated in Figure 2 , which is based on the results reported in Model 11.
The baseline for all demonstrations is at the 10 th percentile of the producer (no prior evaluations) and country (60 prior evaluations) experience variables. Here the sensitivity of price to quality is 0.114, while its sensitivity to producer and country reputation is 0.166 and 0.115, respectively.
When the producer experience variable increases to the 90 th percentile of its distribution (38 prior evaluations), the effect of quality on price increases to 0.239, while the effect of producer reputation increases to 0.333. On the other hand, the same increase in producer experience causes the sensitivity to country reputation to fall to -0.262. When the country experience variable increases to the 90 th percentile of its distribution (2,217 prior evaluations), the effect of the quality score roughly triples to 0.399, while the effect of producer reputation moves to 0.528.
Once again, the same increases causes a reduction in the sensitivity of price to country reputation to -0.295.
Figure 2 about here DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
For experience goods (i.e., those for which quality can not be determined in advance of purchase), consumers rely on a host of market signals to make their valuations. However, these signals are not generated in a vacuum and their transmission and reception must be analyzed in context (Spence, 1974: 3) . In order for a signal to have an impact on consumer behavior, it must first be noticed (Olshavsky, 1994) . Our aim in this paper is to introduce and test the proposition that the sensitivity of the prices of product and service offerings to the quality signals that they generate is related to the stage of firm and industry development. More specifically, the attention that consumers pay to a given quality signal depends on the producer's market experience, as well as the experience of other associated producers.
Our analysis of New World wine price-quality relationships strongly supports this position. A wine's price is related to both its own quality, and to its producer's reputation for quality.
However, these relationships depend on the level of market experience of both the producer, and other producers from the same country. As experience accumulates, consumers pay more attention to product-and producer-specific quality signals. At the same time, they become less reliant on more diffuse signals, such as a country's reputation for quality.
Deeper analysis of the two experience effects indicates that a producer's own efforts to increase the attention paid to its products implies a trade-off. Cumulative prior evaluations leads to a reduction in price, in addition to the increased sensitivity of price to quality signals. This cost may come in the form of lower exclusivity -producers that have sold a lot of wine in the past may be viewed as mass market producers and lack the cachet of boutique wineries. However, it makes more sense to see the number of evaluations and the quality of those evaluations in tandem. From Model 11, we determine the change in price due to a unit increase in prior evaluations as: -0.092 + 0.033*Quality + 0.044*Producer Reputation -0.099*Country
Reputation. If a producer produces with consistent quality over time, then product quality equals producer reputation. Setting country reputation to the sample average (0.005), we calculate the level of quality at which the effect of an additional unit of market experience becomes positive:
1.201. This suggests that a producer derives a net benefit from an additional evaluation as long as it produces at a quality that is slightly above the sample average.
On the other hand, the experience of same-country wineries generates the expected price sensitivity effects, but no negative main effect on price. This is consistent with Ingram and Baum (1997) , who argue that firms benefit from both their own and their industry's experience.
However, whereas firms eventually become constrained by their own experience, this is not so for industry experience. In our case, producer's benefit from the attention spillovers without suffering the loss of exclusivity implied by high previous output levels. With this in mind, we must still recognize a strategic trade-off by considering that same-country product evaluations also contribute to a country's reputation for quality. In the early stages of industry development (i.e., when producer and country experience levels are low), the positive impact of country reputation on price suggests that producers may be harmed by the quality demonstrations of lower-quality associated producers. As experience accumulates, this effect reverses and the focal producer is harmed by the quality demonstrations of higher-quality associated producers.
This latter point has implications for how markets evolve over time. In the early stages of market development, one is tempted to focus on the free-rider problem. New producers may enter with low-quality offerings and not experience a large price penalty relative to the higher-quality producers. While the idea of a collective reputation suggests that these low-quality products will harm high-quality producers, our results vis a vis consumer attention suggest that there is also a side benefit accruing to the high quality producers. Through the increased attention conferred by increased associated market experience, the high-quality producers receive greater scrutiny and therefore greater returns to their investments in quality. As collective experience accumulates and potential consumers pay more attention to the group of associated producers, the returns to the high-quality producers increases. This suggests that high-quality producers may in fact benefit from the early participation of even lower-quality producers.
This affects how we think about policies aimed at export development. A brief look at recent actions within the Australian wine industry suggests at least one way that this is managedthrough the formation of bodies such as the Australian Wine Export Council, which was formed in 1992 to promote and regulate export activity. This council is responsible for matters that relate to the promotion of the export of grape products, including matters that may affect adversely the export trade in grape products, and one of its specific objectives "is to ensure that Australian wines intended for export are of sound and merchantable quality. The aim is to maintain the reputation of Australian wine in overseas markets by preventing the export of wines that have faults." Here, the Australian authorities recognize the public good problems stemming from country reputations and are working to constrain any negative quality demonstrations on the part of exporters. However, by 1992, Australian wine producers had recorded 640 prior quality demonstrations. Model 11 in Table 6 suggests that at this point, the impact of the country reputation variable was down to 0.004. In other words, the main externality at the time that the Export Council was established was the positive externality due to attention spillovers. This suggests that the more critical function of this council was not that of controlling product quality, but rather inducing more Australian wineries to participate in export markets.
In terms of research into legitimacy, this paper makes a pair of contributions. First, by looking at how the legitimacy of a product increases with the experience of both the focal producer, as well as the cohort of associated producers, we provide some insight into how legitimacy effects may differ in the later, versus the earlier stages of market evolution. According to our results, in the early stages of market development, all associated producers benefit (more or less equally) from the increased attention paid by consumers. As collective experience accumulates, consumers pay closer attention to the signals that are generated and the higher quality producers begin to receive premiums for their demonstrations of quality. If scrutinized markets tend to become more competitive over time (and the results in Table 6 suggest that they do), and if quality is an attribute that is rewarded by consumers, we should see a winnowing out of low-quality producers and the emergence of a group of experienced, high-quality producers. At the same time, the accumulated producer-specific experience of these producers place them at an advantage relative to newcomers, who, even if they do produce at high quality, will not get the boost in price associated with producer-specific attention. These two forces combine to transfer the balance of attention to the cohort of long-lived survivors who tend to endure in the latter stages of market evolution. While this specific dynamic is worthy of closer scrutiny, it does suggest an important transfer of attention, an element of cognitive legitimacy, from all firms in a group toward the long-lived, high-quality producers.
Our results also extend Zuckerman's (1999) articulation of a legitimacy discount. In his analysis, firm securities traded at a discount when they were not evaluated by the appropriate analysts.
The New World wines in our sample are those that were evaluated by the Wine Spectator. As such, they were viewed as legitimate in the eyes of US wine experts. However, to the extent that they lacked a strong history of prior evaluations, new (or previously unnoticed) producers were not afforded the same status as those that were evaluated regularly over time. This suggests that the legitimacy discount to which Zuckerman (1999) refers is not an on-off phenomenon, but rather reflects a gradual process whereby the benefits of increased attention and legitimacy are augmented each time a producer receives the appropriate critical attention.
In closing, we note that the issue of competition for attention has not received sufficient attention in our analysis. We have argued that associated producers will be impacted jointly by the mutual attraction of attention to their products. This is not to suggest that there will never be competition for attention. At some point, the attention paid to one producer, or to a group of associated producers, must come at the expense of others (Kahneman, 1973) . Otherwise, we could not credibly argue that bounded rationality implies constraints on attention. In the current context, one potential source of competition for attention comes from other New World producers. The amount of attention paid to a given product is a positive function of the experience of samecountry producers. If wines from all New World countries are also associated in the minds of consumers, then one may similarly expect that the attention paid to a quality signal will be augmented by the market experience of other-country producers. On the other hand, if this association is not strong, then we may expect the attention paid to the wines from one New World country to be adversely affected by the experience of other wine-producing countries. As suggested above, the question of consumer associations is an empirical one. In a separate, unreported analysis, we found that including a variable that captures other New World country experience and its interactions with the quality and reputation variables does improve the fit of our models. Suffice to say, the precise magnitudes of complementarity and competition depending on the intensity and type of product association is worthy of more detailed generate. This expectation is based on the belief that experience-based attention depreciates rapidly. However, research into experience effects in other contexts suggests that while there is some depreciation of experience-based producer learning, it is not necessarily immediate (Argote, 1999) . This suggests that Old World producers may continue to benefit from the attention that their historical experience levels generated. Answering this question requires further work into the processes of attention decay to complement our discussion of attention accumulation.
Finally, we note that the focus in this paper is on the emergence of a new class of producer within an established industry. Moreover, the industry that we studied has some peculiarities that are worthy of mention. The level of critical attention in the wine is quite high, with several major publications devoted to providing quality ratings on a consistent basis. Moreover, new wine products are produced annually, and the quality of each vintage is affected by a number of factors that are beyond the control of the producer. Finally, there is a strong 'fashion' component to wine consumption, with different producers and regions capturing the imagination of consumers at different points in time. With the strength and consistency of the results reported here, it will be intriguing to see whether they hold in other industry contexts. It would be doubly interesting to see whether the results hold for the emergence of a completely novel industry. 
(1) Real Price (Price/CPI) 
